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The current explanation of accidents is derived from an analysis of proximate events and some 
contributing causal factors, whereas the role of a wider socio-technical context that give rise to systemic causal 
mechanisms is often left unexplained. The paper describes analysis results of a recent maritime incident with 
the purpose to illuminate the causal factors, including systemic ones, and offers a different, more 
comprehensive explanation of the incident causation to that which is given in the accident investigation report. 
The study seeks to provide valuable input for enhancements in overall maritime safety control and proactive 
safety management at the ship and shipping company levels. With the gained knowledge, resources committed 
to risk management can be better allocated, reducing associated costs and improving on business objectives. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The sinking of RMS Titanic in 1912 has 
become symbolic of risk at sea, and has been used as 
a global metaphor for avoidable catastrophe, 
overconfidence, complacency and any other folly. It 
gave a useful lesson, the sobering realisation that 
safety was lagging behind technological 
advancements which were available in support of 
commercial course. And the accident causes were 
much deeper and wider than was concluded at the 
time. The investigation was limited to decision 
errors on the part of the Master: ³Captain Smith had 
failed to take proper heed of ice warnings. Collision 
was the direct result of steaming into a dangerous 
area at too high speed´ (Butler, 1998), and the role 
of systemic causal factors, which had been present a 
long time before the ship was even built, was not 
explained. These were the absence of harmonised 
safety regulations and safety control (recall the hasty 
                                                     
1
 International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS) is an international maritime treaty which 
sets minimum safety standards in the construction, 
equipment and operation of merchant ships. 
2
 Captain Smith in 1907: µ:KHQDQ\RQHDVNVPH
how I can best describe my experiences in nearly 40 years 
at sea, I merely say, uneventful. Of course, there have 
been winter gales, and storms and fog and the like, but in 
introduction of SOLAS1 in the aftermath) (Angel, 
2012), overconfidence and complacency ³«I can 
best describe my experiences in nearly 40 years at 
sea « [as]« uneventful.´ 2  (Fitzgibbon, 2012), 
inadequate preparedness reflected in the limited 
number of lifeboats, etc.), and the commercial 
pressure on White Star Line company to cross the 
Atlantic ahead of competitors. The latter contributed 
to a recently discovered fact about a coal fire in the 
engine room, burning for days before the tragic 
voyage and still during it (Taplin, 2017). As a result, 
the ship was at risk of serious explosions, which 
contriEXWHG WR WKH &DSWDLQ¶V GHFLVLRQ WR VSHHG XS
Although the fire had been contained, it had 
weakened an adjacent watertight bulkhead which 
buckled under the water pressure, making the 
collision with the iceberg fatal. As we show in this 
paper, this story of Titanic is not an anachronism, 
and it serves as the epitome of complex causation 
behind maritime accidents. Maritime accident 
all my experience I have never been in any accident of any 
sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in 
distress in all my years at sea ± a brig, the crew of which 
were taken off in a small boat in charge of my third officer. 
I never saw a wreck and have never been wrecked, nor 
was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in 
disaster of any sort. You see, I am not very good material 
IRUDVWRU\¶ 
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analysis needs to look for the bigger picture, so the 
safety problem can be reconstructed and understood 
better, and consequently addressed in a more cost 
effective way.  
Marine accident investigations serve to 
inform improvements in design and operational 
practices. This is an evolutionary strategy for risk 
management, which aims to create safer systems 
through progressive enhancements in response to 
lessons from the latest incidents and accidents 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Accident analysis, therefore, 
plays a decisive role in safety development. 
However, this process is only as good as the core 
understanding derived from accident analysis and 
the explanation of causes. In the worst case, an 
inaccurate accident investigation could cause the 
wrong changes to be implemented in rules and 
regulations. The current explanation of accidents 
remains limited to proximate events (e.g., oil leaks, 
hot surfaces) and contributing causal factors (e.g., 
poor maintenance, inadequate SMS), whereas the 
role of a wider socio-technical context that has given 
rise to systemic causal mechanisms behind major 
maritime accidents is hardly explained, despite the 
evidence (recall the case with Titanic and Le Boreal 
later described in the paper). Consequently, 
investments in safety programmes can prove futile 
and problematic in the end.  
Following on from the epitomic 
circumstances around the Titanic disaster, fires in 
engine rooms (ER) continue to remain one of the 
safety challenges for the shipping industry.  A study 
by Det Norske Veritas ± Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-
GL) claims that two thirds of ship fires have started 
in the ER, with more than half of them resulting from 
the contact between combustible oils and high 
temperature surfaces. Recent examples with 
passenger ships include Zenith in 2013, Carnival 
Liberty, Splendour of the Seas, and Le Boreal in 
2015, to name a few.  
In this paper, we use a systemic accident 
model to capture causal factors behind a recent ER 
fire onboard of cruise ship Le Boreal. To this end, 
we adopted systemic accident model Systems-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) 
and its method for causal analysis called Causal 
Analysis using System STAMP (CAST) (N. 
Leveson, 2011). In contrast to conventional 
sequential and epidemiological models (e.g., 
Domino theory, Swiss cheese) which have 
permeated the current approach to accident analysis, 
the CAST process allows the analysis of the entire 
socio-technical system, going beyond proximate 
events and contributing factors. The presented work 
analyses the causation of the Le Boreal incident in 
terms of three types of causal factors. These are a 
chain of proximate events (direct factors), 
contributing conditions that allowed the proximate 
events to occur, and systemic factors that pushed the 
system towards the state of heightened risk 
(Johnson, 1980; Rasmussen, 1997). The direct and 
contributing causal factors can be aligned in a chain 
of concatenated events (typically post hoc) 
preceding an unwanted event such as the fire 
outbreak. They are represented as linear links from 
causes to effects and hence are easy to understand 
and communicate. In contrast, the systemic, 
underlying causal factors have nonlinear effect on 
the unwanted outcome, and they can only be 
captured and explained by a systemic accident model 
such as CAST.  
The paper focuses on identification of causal 
factors that led to the fire incident, ignoring the 
events following the fire outbreak. Hence, the focus 
is on accident prevention. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
provides a summary of the incident. Section 3 
explains the methodology used, Section 4 performs 
the actual incident analysis, Section 5 summarises 
the analysis results and recommendations, and 
Section 6 concludes the paper.   
2 INCIDENT SUMMARY 
Cruise ship Le Boreal (IMO no. 9502506) was 
built by Fincantieri in 2010 to be operated by 
Compagnie du Ponant, a cruise ship operator, under 
French flag. The ship is 10,944 GT, 142.1 m in 
length, 18 m in beam and 4.8 m in draught, and 
carries 264 passengers and 136 crew. The vessel is 
powered by 2 x 2300 kW electric motors; four 1600 
kW diesel-generators (Wärtsilä 8L20) and one 
Caterpillar emergency generator rated at of 800 kW. 
On 18 November 2015, the vessel suffered a 
major engine room fire, which caused the loss of all 
power and left her drifting. The fire broke out at the 
diesel generator (DG) No. 3 turbo-blower and 
rapidly spread via the bunched electric cables, to the 
upper decks of the engine compartment. The captain 
ordered the ship, with 347 passengers and crew, to 
be abandoned early in the morning. A distress call 
was issued just after 2 a.m. while it was near Cape 
Dolphin, the northerly point of East Falkland, 
Falkland Islands. As the vessel was drifting towards 
the coast, the master made the decision to drop 
anchor and to evacuate the passengers and almost all 
the crewmembers, with the support of the Royal 
Navy and of the /¶$8675$/KHUVLVWHU-ship owned 
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by the same company. There were no injuries to the 
passengers or crew. 
The incident was subsequently investigated 
by French marine casualty investigation board, 
Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Événements de Mer 
(BEAmer), which issued its findings in a report in 
July 2016. The report was developed in compliance 
ZLWK WKH ³&RGH IRU WKH ,QYHVWLJDWLRQ RI 0DULQH
&DVXDOWLHV DQG $FFLGHQWV´ DV SHU ,02 5HVROXWLRQ
MSC 255(84) and the EU regulation N°1286/2011 
on a common methodology for investigating marine 
casualties and incidents. The report is accessible 
online (BEAmer, 2016). 
 
Table 1: Timeline before the fire (17-18 Nov 2015) 
11:20 Hotel Officer (HO) begins a patrol 
11:30 HO notices that a duplex filter is clogged 
on DG4 and switches to the reserve filter, 
he detects an odour of exhaust gases. 
11:35 HO ends the patrol and logs parameters in 
the logbook in the Engine Control Room 
(ECR) 
00:00 Engineering Officer (EO) starts his shift, 
HO reports about the filter and exhaust 
smell. EO stays in ECR 
00:10 HO attempts to replace the clogged filter 
on DG3, which was running. Unscrews 
the cover. Pressurised oil leaks. HO 
observes a fireball next to turbo-blower 
exhaust elbow of DG3 
00:16 File alarm sounds 
 
The investigation found the following contributing 
conditions that led to the incident occurring:  
x The HO had concerns about the quality of the 
Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) being used, which 
contributed to the decision to replace the reserve 
filter without waiting for a mechanic rating to 
arrive in the morning.  
x The established practice was to replace the filter 
cartridges very frequently (2 to 3 times a day, 
YHUVXV WKH PDQXIDFWXUHU¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ RI
every 1,000 hours). This was understood to be 
due to switching from HFO to Marine Diesel Oil 
(MDO), which quickly clogged filters.  
x There was no coding system, no interlock 
mechanism to preclude the filter replacement 
when under pressure existed.  
x The HO was alone, therefore there was no 
benefit of a cross check. The understaffing was 
identified during the investigation: a rating had 
been needed to assist in ER. 
x During the patrol (shortly before the incident), 
the HO did not notice any problem with the 
lagging cover of the turbo-blower exhaust elbow 
of DG3, which was likely dysfunctional already. 
No action was taken to rectify the hazard, as a 
result. 
 
The investigation concluded that "the engineer 
officer who carried out the replacement of a clogged 
fuel filter element had been presumably misled by a 
faulty visual memory and undertook the disassembly 
of an element under pressure" (BEAmer, 2016). That 
is, the investigators alluded to the human error. 
BEAmer recommended that the company consider 
the addition of a mechanic rating during the night 
watches and reengineer the fuel system to segregate 
MDO and HFO, which shared the same fuel feeding 
line (the filter clogged rapidly when shifting to 
MDO). The company made changes by forbidding 
solitary maintenance of the fuel feeding lines, 
migrating to a new generation of filters with a fuel 
pressure warning device and a purge valve, and 
installing a protection screen to prevent the contact 
between oil sprays and unprotected high temperature 
surfaces.         
3 METHODOLOGY 
The adopted methodology rests on CAST that 
allows examining the entire socio-technical system, 
taking into account both separate variables and 
systemic causal factors (N. Leveson, 2011; N. G. 
Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 2003). CAST has 
been applied to analyse individual railway, aviation 
and maritime accidents (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 
2016; Song, Zhong, & Zhong, 2012; Wong, 2004); 
comparisons also exist with other accident analysis 
methods (Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 2012; 
Underwood & Waterson, 2014). 
As STAMP is based on systems and control 
theories, it treats safety as a dynamic control 
problem where the role of feedback loops is essential 
for control. The objective of CAST is essentially to 
identify scenarios that show where and why safety 
constraints were inadequately enforced by the safety 
control structure. CAST uses a generic taxonomy to 
classify control flows that constitute hazards, which 
then may lead to accidents (Figure 1). We use the 
GHILQLWLRQRIDVDIHW\KD]DUGDV³Dsystem state or set 
of conditions that, together with a particular set of 
worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to a 
ORVV´(N. Leveson, 2011). 
    




Figure 1: Generic classification of control flaws 
that lead to hazards (N. Leveson, 2011) 
Then, given a particular accident description, 
the CAST process is as follows:  
1. Identify the system(s) and hazard(s) 
involved in the loss. 
2. Identify the system safety constraints and 
system requirements associated with that 
hazard. 
3. Document a safety control structure in place 
to control the hazard and enforce the safety 
constraints. 
4. Determine the proximate events leading to 
the loss. 
5. Analyse the loss at the physical system level. 
Identify the contribution of hazard control 
flows to the loss. 
6. Moving up the levels of the safety control 
structure, determine how and why each 
successive higher level allowed or 
contributed to the inadequate control at the 
current level.  
7. Examine overall coordination and 
communication contributors to the loss. 
8. Determine the dynamics and changes in the 
system and the system control structure 
relating to the loss and any weakening of the 
safety control over time. 
9. Generate recommendations. 
 
The first two steps serve the understanding of 
physical hazards (controlled hazardous processes) 
and safety constraints (engineering and/or 
management) put in place to control them. A 
hierarchical safety control structure is then built 
upon this, so these constraints can be effectively 
enforced. The safety control structure (step 3) also 
outlines the system under consideration. It defines 
the system boundaries that enclose the system 
elements considered for analysis. The purpose of a 
safety control structure is to control hazards by 
enforcing safety constraints. This structure includes 
the roles and responsibilities of each component 
(subsystem) in the structure as well as the controls 
provided or created to execute their responsibilities 
and the relevant feedback provided to them to help 
them do this (N. Leveson, 2011). The role of each 
component in the safety control structure is 
described as follows: 
x Safety requirements and constraints to be 
controlled/enforced 
x Means of controls/enforcement 
x Context 
o Roles and responsibilities 
o Environmental and behaviour-
shaping factors 
x Dysfunctional interactions, failures, and 
flawed decisions leading to erroneous 
control actions 
x Reasons for the flawed control actions and 
dysfunctional interactions (as shown in 
Figure 1).  
 
4 ANALYSIS 
4.1 System involved in the incident 
The purpose of a ship is to transport goods and 
people in the most cost efficient way, subject to 
schedule, safety, environmental and other 
requirements. A general safety requirement implies 
that risk to health and safety of people has to be 
maintained below some intolerable level and has to 
be further reduced as low as practicable. To this end, 
a safety control system has been established to 
control a number of safety hazards (risks), with a fire 
being one of them. In the Le Boreal incident, the 
high-level safety control system comprised the ship 
itself (Le Boreal), shipping company (Compagnie du 
Ponant), shipyard (Fincantieri), maritime 
administration (Registre International Français - 
RIF, Centres de Sécurité des Navires - CSN), class 
society (Bureau Veritas - BV), and International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO), as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Parties involved in safety control (high-level 
representation) 
Each component in the system has its specific 
function (responsibilities) in safety control 
(Kristiansen, 2005). Thus, IMO issues safety 
standards for construction, equipment and operation 
of ships, receives feedback from member states, 
inter-governmental organisations, and non-
governmental organisations. The IMO has no power 
to enforce international safety regulations (hence the 
dashed lines in Figure 2), as this task is passed to flag 
states. The class society controls technical standards 
on behalf of the flag state and insurers during design, 
construction and operation. It also carries out regular 
surveys and inspections to ensure continuing 
compliance with the standards. Acting on behalf of 
the state, a maritime administration enforces 
international safety regulations by issuing safety 
certificates (STCW, ISM Code, MLC etc.)3, carrying 
out flag state inspection of operational vessels etc. 
This includes, inter alia, the control of minimal safe 
manning, qualification of seafarers, hours of work, 
medical certificates etc. The shipyard builds, 
integrates, tests and repairs the vessel and equipment 
to the owner¶V specification and safety rules and 
regulations, and develops operational and 
maintenance requirements with respect to safety. 
The corresponding input from original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers with whom the 
shipyard closely cooperates (e.g., Wärtsilä supplies 
diesel generators), is essential here. This information 
becomes an integral part of onboard operational 
manuals and the safety management system. The 
equipment have to be type approved by classification 
societies and to comply with safety regulations such 
as Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC), SOLAS, and 
others. The shipping company is responsible for 
                                                     
3
 The International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
crewing, operation and maintenance of the vessel on 
behalf of the ship owner. It develops and maintains 
a safety management system (SMS) according to the 
ISM Code, which specifies responsibility, authority 
and interrelation of key personnel. The company is 
responsible to ensure adequate resources, including 
their training and selection, and shore-based support. 
The ship is under command of the master who has 
superior responsibility for safe ship operation and 
implementation of the SMS onboard. Engineers are 
responsible for safe operation and maintenance of 
equipment. 
As Figure 2 indicates, there are two-way 
interactions in safety control, involving control 
actions and feedback. As explained in Section 3 and 
to be discussed below, dysfunctions in these 
interactions (e.g., wrong control actions, untimely 
feedback) constituted the causal factors of the Le 
Boreal incident.  
 
4.2 Hazards and system safety requirements 
and constraints 
One of the high-level hazards that was not 
properly controlled in the incident could be 
described as: Routine maintenance actions (or the 
lack thereof) led (immediately or later) to 
uncontrolled release of hazardous energy (e.g., high 
temperature surfaces above >220qC, combustible 
oil mist in the atmosphere). 
The corresponding generic safety 
requirements (SR) would be necessary to prevent 
such a situation and effectively mitigate its 
consequences, should it nevertheless occur (as per 
six functions of defences by (Reason, 1993)):   
x Protection (SR1): Barriers shall be provided 
between the hazards and the potential victims 
under normal operating conditions.  
x Detection (SR2): The occurrence of an off-
normal condition, an unsafe act or the presence 
of hazardous substances shall be timely 
detected. 
x Warning (SR3): The presence of and the nature 
of the hazard shall be signalled to those likely to 
be exposed to its dangers. 
x Recovery (SR4): The system shall be restored to 
a safe state as quickly as possible. 
x Containment (SR5): The spread of the hazard in 
the event of a failure in any or all of the prior to 
defensive function shall be restricted. 
(STCW), International Safety Management Code (ISM 
Code), Maritime Labour Convention (MCL). 
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x Escape (SR6): The safe evacuation of all 
potential victims after an accident shall be 
ensured.  
 
With respect to prevention in particular, additional 
safety requirements can be added as follows (as per 
three types of barriers by (N. G. Leveson, 1995)): 
x Lockout (SR7): A dangerous event shall be 
prevented from occurring, or something or 
someone shall be prevented from entering a 
dangerous area or state.     
x Lockin (SR8): A safe system state or condition 
shall be maintained or preserved. 
x Interlock (SR9): A correct sequencing of 
actions/events shall be enforced or events (of 
which simultaneous occurrence is hazardous) 
shall be isolated in time or by physical barriers.   
 
In the Le Boreal incident, some of these safety 
requirements were violated: 
x SR1: The hotel officer (HO) was not protected 
from the explosion in his vicinity (the result of 
the contact between the oil spray and 
unprotected high temperature surface).   
x SR7, SR2, SR3: The HO was not prevented from 
undertaking the replacement of the fuel filter 
which was in use and hence under pressure. The 
hazardous action by the HO was not detected 
and there was no warning about the imminent 
danger.  
x SR8: A safe operating condition of the DG was 
not preserved.   
x SR9: The hotel officer was not 
instructed/reminded to follow a safe sequence of 
maintenance actions (e.g., by an assistant 
engineer) and/or there was no automatic 
interlock mechanism that would shut down the 
DG or fuel supply.  
x SR2, SR3: The inadequate thermal insulation of 
the turbo-blower exhaust elbow had not been 
timely detected and consequently no warning 
about the unprotected heat source was given.  
 
An accident cause is the presence of dysfunctional 
interactions in the safety control of the system, the 
interactions that led to the violation of the safety 
constraints (N. Leveson, 2011). Hence, the answers 
as to why the above safety requirements were not 
enforced or adequately controlled lie in the safety 
control system that appeared to be dysfunctional. 
The entire safety control structure has to be analysed, 
looking for dysfunctional interactions between its 
components (subsystems), along with an explanation 
 
Figure 3: Safety control structure (shown information flows are not exhaustive) 
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as to how they could give rise to direct and 
contributing events that preceded the incident.  
 
4.3 Safety control structure 
A high-level safety control structure (SCS) 
was earlier shown in Figure 2, but more detailed one 
is necessary for the incident analysis in the following 
sections (Figure 3).  The safety responsibilities of the 
actors involved in safety control are explained in 
Section 4.1, with the exception of the Chief Engineer 
(CE) who is included in the more detailed version in 
Figure 3. The CE   is responsible, inter alia, for all 
operations and maintenance of machinery 
equipment, as well as for safety of subordinate 
engineers. He specifically ensures compliance with 
the rules and regulations and internal safety 
management system (SMS), carries out frequent 
inspections of equipment, issues standing orders for 
each crew member under his command, in 
accordance with the routine maintenance schedule as 
prescribed by equipment manufactures.  
 
4.4 Chain of proximate events 
The chain of proximate events is described in 
Table 1. 
 
4.5 Analysis of the physical process 
On the level of the physical processes, the 
dysfunctional interaction between the engineers (the 
hotel officer / HO and engineering officer / EO) and 
the equipment (diesel generators, fuel filters, exhaust 
piping) was the direct cause of the incident. In 
particular, the control actions of the hazardous 
equipment (i.e., the maintenance of the duplex fuel 
filter) was inadequate. The reason why the HO made 
this decision was related to the fact that there were 
no adequate feedback and prevention mechanisms in 
place to inform the right decision (see the violation 
of safety constraints SR7, SR2, SR3, and SR9 in 
Section 4.2). The absence of timely and accurate 
feedback led to an inconsistent mental (process) 
model, i.e. the wrong understanding about the 
system state (Figure 1). Hence, the first question is 
why the feedback and prevention mechanisms were 
not in place? Such mechanisms could be engineering 
(e.g., a coding system preventing access to the nuts 
of the cover of the filter in operation, an interlock, 
visual/audio warning) or organisational (e.g., an 
assistant engineer). The investigation report 
indicates that the HO carried out the maintenance 
without waiting for a mechanic rating coming in the 
morning. It would be reasonable to assume²and 
there is contradiction in the report²that the HO 
followed the safety maintenance procedures by 
taking this initiative.  
Another reason for the wrong control actions 
could be related to the flaws in the control algorithm 
(Figure 1), i.e. the understanding of safe 
maintenance procedures or responsibilities. Hence, 
the second question is why the engineer might not be 
as familiar with the safe maintenance procedures or 
his responsibilities as he should be? Did he receive 
adequate training? 
The explosion would not have happened had 
the surface of the turbo-blower exhaust elbow been 
properly thermo-insulated. The third question is why 
the heat source was not timely detected and warned 
about? That is, why the feedback about the hazard 
was missing? Alternatively, why the adequate 
detection (visual or automatic), assessment and 
action mechanism was not in place? Did automatic 
detection fail? Where there objective or/and 
subjective factors that made the detection difficult 
(impossible)? Did the engineers receive necessary 
training to detect such hazards in given 
circumstances?  
Although other safety constraints were also 
violated (see Section 4.2), we will address them 
indirectly through our analysis of the above 
questions only. Note, our adopted line of thought 
assumes the engineer acted according the best of his 
knowledge, training and information available at the 
time. As long as the information about the controlled 
process state is accurate and training is right, no 
unsafe action can be expected (N. Leveson, 2011). 
This contrasts with the conventional approach where 
his actions would typically be considered as 
erroneous, with the identified human error being 
attributed as the key cause and, often would result in 
the end of the accident analysis. In the modern 
thinking the human error is not the end or outcome, 
but is the start of accident analysis (Dekker, 2014). 
Human errors are not causes but symptoms of deeper 
issues in the system. Hence, the analysis has to 
involve the higher levels of safety control to 
understand the factors that gave rise to unsafe 
decisions by the engineers working in the immediate 
contact with the hazardous processes (at the sharp 
end) they control.  
 
4.6 Analysis of higher levels of safety control 
Moving up the levels of the safety control 
structure, we further determine how and why each 
successive higher level allowed or contributed to the 
inadequate control at the physical process level. We 
use the earlier formulated questions to guide the 
analysis.  
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The Chief Engineer (CE) was responsible for 
controlling safe work procedures in the engine room. 
That did not happen due to one or several reasons 
(Figure 1 and Figure 3): inadequate feedback, 
inconsistent process (mental) model of the 
controlled system, inadequate skills (unclear 
responsibilities, incompetence, lack of training), 
inappropriate control/management actions, or 
wrong/missing control/input from the top. 
Inadequate feedback. The investigation 
underlined the staffing problem, which had led to the 
HO working alone, without the benefit of a 
crosscheck. The report gives no evidence about the 
awareness of the CE about it, was he aware? If not 
why? There is also no evidence about the CE 
awareness about established practice of frequently 
replacing fuel filters. Was he aware or why not? 
What was done about it, e.g. were risks assessed?  
Inconsistent process (mental) model. The 
CE¶V understanding about the O&M practices 
remains unclear, unless the above questions are 
answered.   
Inadequate skills. The investigation report 
provides no direct evidence of the CE inadequately 
exercising his responsibilities, nor is there evidence 
of any factors that would undermine his actions. 
However, the presence of unprotected high 
temperature surfaces points to an inadequate 
enforcement of the SMS, i.e. insufficient control of 
safe work practices. Given the unsafe actions by the 
engineer, it remains unclear whether the HO was 
completely familiar with the safe maintenance 
procedures and had received adequate training. Did 
the CE take actions to make sure it was the case? Or, 
if the CE felt the training was inadequate, did he 
promulgate the training issue to the Captain and the 
Company? Did a tracking system to monitor training 
exist? However, there is no basis to assume that had 
the CE been aware of the maintenance risks, the 
problem would be communicated up the 
management system. Was it communicated but not 
addressed yet? There is no evidence about this in the 
report. Was the CE unaware of the maintenance 
risks? If so, that could be related to the lack of skills 
in risk assessment or deficiencies in the methods 
used and practiced, leading to complacency as a 
result. So, did the SMS provide an adequate means 
of assessing risks? Were adequate resources 
available for this purpose? Who was responsible to 
provide such resources?  
Flawed supra-control/input. The CE reports to 
the Master. There is no evidence in the report 
whether the staffing problem reached the top of the 
Company and was not timely addressed because of 
other priorities, or complacency. However, a 
question could be asked if that had been the case? If 
it had, this would point out to flaws in safety control 
on the part of Master/Company. The fact that the 
risky maintenance was carried out, indicates flaws in 
the SMS and insufficient training of CE and 
engineers on safe work procedures, SMS, and risk 
assessment. That is, the safety control on the part of 
Company could be deficient. However, whether the 
Company was receiving adequate and timely 
feedback about risks onboard, i.e. feedback on the 
SMS, resources etc. remains unknown from the 
investigation report. The understanding of this 
would shed light on how and why the safety control 
by the Master/Company was deficient. In order to 
move lessons up and down though the control 
structure a safety information system must be part of 
the SMS. 
Moving up the levels, the next safety 
controller is the Ship/Master and Company. Further 
to the investigation conclusions and the above 
discussion in this section, the Company did 
potentially provide inadequate safety control due to 
one or several causes discussed as follows.     
Inadequate feedback. As indicated above, 
there is no clear evidence in the report about the 
adequacy of feedback from the ship management 
(CE and Master) to the Company. Either scenario is 
possible. First, the Company was aware about the 
staffing and other problems, but had not addressed 
them in time, or second, the Company was unaware 
about the problems, because the ship management 
had not identified them as risks. The former case 
points to the potential conflict between safety and 
other objectives (e.g., commercial) at the Company, 
whereas the latter points to the insufficient risk 
assessment skills of onboard personnel or 
deficiencies in the SMS.         
Inconsistent process (mental) model. The 
Company¶V understanding about the organisational 
risks remains unclear, unless the above questions are 
answered. However, it is pretty certain there was 
limited awareness about design related hazards, 
design limitations or safety barriers (defences). The 
engine room was missing a number of them such as 
a coding system preventing access to the nuts of the 
cover of the filter in operation, an interlock to 
automatically shut down the DG or fuel line, a 
visual/audio warning about the pressurised fuel 
filter, and automatic detection of heat sources and 
alarms. It is reasonable to assume that the Company 
would have captured these design limitations in the 
SMS, had it known about the risks associated. So 
why did the Company not know about these design 
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limitations? A possible answer is that they were not 
adequately communicated by the shipyard or design 
agent (discussed later).     
Inadequate skills/expertise shortage. As 
highlighted so far, Le Boreal likely operated a SMS 
with a number of dormant hazards (violated safety 
requirements). Some of them were design related, 
while others were operational. Nevertheless, the 
Company could potentially identify the hazards 
(e.g., scenarios of when heat sources are 
undetected/remain present for a period of time, 
maintenance of pressurised fuel lines are carried out, 
etc.) by a thorough risk assessment and modifying 
the SMS accordingly. So, was the assessment carried 
out? What methods/resources were used? Were 
those scenarios identified? Why were they not acted 
upon? Were they assumed to be improbable? These 
questions are critical to assess the robustness of the 
safety management systems in the Company fleet. 
With this in mind, it can be said that this incident was 
waiting to happen. It would not be surprising to learn 
that similar unsafe maintenance actions had 
happened before on this or a sister ship, leading 
perhaps to unreported near misses. Was this 
considered during the investigation?  
Flawed supra-control/input. The Ship and the 
Company were controlled by the marine 
administration and the class society through 
inspections, surveys, audits and other measures. 
There is no direct evidence in the report of any flaws 
in this safety control. However, had the adequacy of 
manning levels in the engine room ever been 
questioned by the administration or class? If it had 
not, then it may have been a potential oversight. If it 
had been, then why had the Company not been 
required to act to resolve the issue? These and other 
questions need to be answered to understand the role 
of the regulators.   
The shipyard and OEMs represent the next 
subsystems that played a key role in this incident. 
We represent the shipyard subsystem in terms of 
three interacting components: project management, 
design, and construction (Figure 3). The project 
management (PM) is generally responsible for 
delivery of a ship design, which is developed by 
design, testing and other departments. The PM 
controls design requirements, safety standards and 
H[SHFWDWLRQVVKLSRZQHU¶VWKURXJKVSHFLILFFRQWURO
and feedback mechanisms shown in Figure 3. The 
shipyard also acts as an integrator of specialised 
equipment such as diesel generators and their 
systems, which are delivered by their manufacturers. 
The OEM of diesel generators was supposed to 
comply, inter alia, with Machinery Directive 
(2006/42/EC), which contains essential health and 
safety requirements for machinery. The directive 
requires from the manufacturer (or his 
representative) to carry out risk assessment on the 
machinery to check if safety requirements are met. 
Limits and hazards of the machinery must be 
determined, including during its intended use and 
any reasonably foreseeable misuse thereof. It seems 
the required risk assessment overlooked the Le 
Boreal scenario and was not identified during the 
subsequent integration by the shipyard. 
 
Inadequate feedback. The shipyard receives 
feedback from the class society in terms of approvals 
and certifications, and potentially from the Company 
on the O&M aspects. As discussed earlier, there 
were several design related hazards which were 
either inadequately communicated to the Company 
(discussed later) or the risk assessment conducted 
did not adequately consider human factor aspects, 
i.e. leaving hazards that could be released during 
maintenance. Nevertheless, the ship design and 
O&M manuals were approved, complying with 
design rules and other requirements. This raises the 
issue of why the design was approved with these 
safety hazards? Were these hazards identified during 
the approval process? Did the class society assume 
they would be dealt with in the SMS? Did the class 
communicate this information to the Company? 
These questions should have been raised during the 
investigation.  
One design decision should be investigated 
related to having the MDO and HFO share the same 
fuel treatment systems. The accident report 
highlights that when the switch between HFO and 
MDO occurs ,the duplex filters had to be replaced 
every few hours, insteDG RI WKH PDQXIDFWXUHU¶V
recommendation of every 1000 hours. The need to 
frequently change filters appears to be related to the 
shared fuel oil processing system (purifiers, duplex 
filters and settling tanks). Did anyone question the 
high usage of fuel filters? Was a design with HFO 
and MDO segregated considered during the 
development of the ship design? Since the ship 
operates in sensitive environments (Arctic and 
Antarctic) has the Company considered only running 
on clearer burning light oil or alternative fuels? 
Another design decision relates to having all 
the diesel generators side by side, without any 
longitudinal bulkhead separating them. The 
collocation of diesel generators and their associated 
cabling meant in this case that all power, except for 
the emergency diesel generator, was lost. The fire 
burned along the cable runs which had limited 
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separation. This raises the question of whether 
alternative engine room arrangements were 
considered during design, especially considering the 
mission of the ship was to travel to very remote, high 
latitude locations? If partial propulsion power had 
been maintained then the risky total evacuation of 
the crew and passengers in a high sea state could 
have potentially been avoided. An alternative could 
have been to lRFDWHDSURSXOVLRQ³HPHUJHQF\´ 
generator high in the ship powered by a gas 
turbine. 
Inconsistent process (mental) model. The PM 
may have not known about the hazards due to the 
absence of feedback from the class society and 
inputs from design, testing and other departments. 
The report contains no evidence that was addressed 
during the investigation.  
Inadequate skills/expertise shortage. The 
design limitations could have not been assessed due 
to one or several reasons: 
x Safety standards/requirements were not obeyed.  
x Risk assessment overlooked the hazards. 
x Risk assessment ruled out the hazard scenarios 
from considerations because either their 
probabilities or consequences were assumed to 
be negligible, or both. 
x There was no risk assessment requirement at all, 
neither from the ship owner nor from the class 
society, or it was potentially assumed that the 
designers would deal with the situation. 
 
Again, there is no information in the report as to 
whether these or similar questions were addressed.  
 
4.7 Coordination and communication 
The analysis in the preceding section shows that a 
possible reason for the SMS to overlook the design 
related hazards was the inadequate communication 
between the shipyard and the Company.  
 
4.8 Dynamics and changes in the system 
There was no direct evidence in the report of 
the organisational drift towards the safety 
boundaries due to financial difficulties in the 
company or in the industry in general (Rasmussen, 
1997), i.e. changes to operation that could 
undermine safety. For instance, was the staffing 
problem in the ER always the case from the 
beginning? Why the ship was operated on two fuels 
(HFO / MDO), given that the fuel filters would get 
clogged with the frequency being significantly 
higher to the one assumed by the designers? Was the 
risk of these deviations (changes) from the design 
intent (if it was so) properly assessed?   
5 RESULTS 
Table 2 lists the identified dysfunctional 
interactions after exploring the entire hierarchical 
safety control (HSC) structure, searching for the 
answers as to who was responsible for ensuring that 
the interactions are adequate and why they not 
happen.     
The shaded rows in Table 2 correspond to the 
interactions that were overlooked in the accident 
investigation report (discussed in Section 2). In 
particular, these are three contributing factors and 
one systemic factor. The CAST analysis pointed to 
these contributing factors, which involved the Chief 
Engineer, by taking into account his responsibilities 
and the functional relationships in the HCS.  
The graphical representation of the 
dysfunctional interactions is shown in Figure 4. The 
blue lines indicate the interactions identified in the 
investigation report, whereas the red ones denote the 
dysfunctional interaction identified through the 
CAST analysis. It should be noted the performed 
analysis of the Le Boreal incident could, in principle, 
have included other elements of the hierarchical 
control structure, such as the maritime 
administration and classification society. For 
instance, why surveys and audits did not recognise 
the solitary maintenance as hazardous? However, we 
felt the evidence of the wide causal picture was very 
weak in this particular case. This cautious approach 
was applied in in the complete analysis as well. 
Hence, the CAST analysis was somewhat 
conservative.  
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When it comes to recommendations with 
respect to these systemic causal factors, safety 
improvements should target the communication 
interfaces on the system level, i.e. between the actors 
involved in safety control. As demonstrated in 
(Rasmussen, 1997), the absence of global, system 
level coordination and communication, even though 
locally the performance of each actor is optimal, has 
been the underlying causal factor behind maritime 
and other accidents. The understanding of how the 
improvements can be achieved on the system level 
requires further research and hence is beyond this 
paper. However, the following initiatives on the 
organisational and company level can contribute to 
the global change:   
x Compliance processes towards Machinery 
Directive (2006/42/EC) and other regulations 
should be probed. More research is necessary to 
better understand the problem.  
x The Company makes sure that all design 
assumptions and limitations (as potential 
hazards), as well as any deviations during 
manufacturing, are well documented and 
communicated to the upper management level of 
the Company. This should be achievable for 
newbuilding projects and for some ships in the 
fleet. 
Table 2: Summary of dysfunctional interactions in safety control of the Le Boreal incident  
Controller  Controlled Description Included? 
Engineers Equipment. Engineer attempted to switch filters on the 
wrong generator Y 
Engineers Equipment 
Engineer was not prevented from 
undertaking unsafe filter change (absence of 




Engineer was not informed about poor 
holding of lagging cover (turbo-blower 
exhaust elbow) which created exposure to 
high temperature surface. 
Y 
Chief Engineer Engineers 
Chief Engineer did not made sure the 
thermal insulation of turbo-blower exhaust 
elbow was properly maintained. Did not 
follow SMS. 
N 
Chief Engineer Engineers 
Chief Engineer did not made sure that the 




company  Ship 
Not robust and vague safety procedures with 





Risk due to solitary undertaking of 
maintenance at night was not assessed and 




Master did not well communicate the 
understaffing (a rating was needed during 









Coding system, interlock, or warning 
mechanism was not provided on the fuel 
filter covers to prevent maintenance errors. 
Y 
Project management 





Safety requirements, analysis methods were 
inadequate, overlooking the materialised 
maintenance hazard.  
N 





No communication of design limitation / 
unprotected hazard with respect to 
maintenance of diesel generators. This was 
therefore not addressed in the SMS. 
N 
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x The development of the SMS considers realistic 
circumstances such as the natural gradient 
towards least effort by crew, the ubiquitous push 
for cost effectiveness, and natural work 
variability (Hollnagel, 2016; Rasmussen, 1997). 
x Clear tracking of safety training, safety meetings 
and the use of active risk management at the user 
(ship) level that is summarised and reported 
periodically to the shore management team. 
x New hazard analysis methods should be 
considered in ship design and subsequent 
development of the SMS. For instance, Systems 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is based on 
STAMP (N. Leveson, 2011) and shows very 
promising results for identifying hazards in 
modern designs operated in complex socio-
technical systems. 
x It is incumbent on the Flag State, regulatory 
bodies and the IMO to ensure a comprehensive 
assessment of the accident is completed. This is 
especially critical since the accident analysis 
process serves as the engine to drive changes to 
design, regulations and operational standards. If 
the accident assessment is flawed or incomplete, 
then the positive changes needed will not be 
recognized and created.  
 
6 CONSLUSIONS 
The paper has applied the systems approach to 
analyse the fire incident in the engine room of the 
cruise ship Le Boreal in 2015. The applied CAST 
process systemically guided the analysis throughout 
the entire socio-technical system involved in safety 
control, analysing individual interactions and their 
role in the incident. This allowed the process to go 
beyond the findings of the accident investigation, 
revealing systemic causal factors, as well as 
potentially additional direct and contributing factors.  
The analysis results yielded a wide array of options 
for remedial actions, which should address: (1) the 
potentially inadequate communication between the 
Company and the shipyard and OEMs, (2) 
inadequate hazard analysis (risk assessment) 
methods and processes used by the Company, when 
developing the SMS, the shipyard, and OEMs when 
assessing design assumptions and limitations. 
Additionally, the causal role of the regulators could 
also be significant to the incident. We have discussed 
how these systemic factors could insidiously give 
rise to the deficient SMS with the incident waiting to 
happen.  
As the identified causal factors and remedial 
actions are systemic, they are not limited to the 
 
Figure 4: Highlighted dysfunctional interactions that led to Le Boreal incident 
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analysed incident only. These are underlying causes 
or conditions in overall safety control and could 
(can) undermine safety of many ships. We believe 
that the results of our study provide a valuable input 
to proactive safety management for the ship, 
company, regulators and governmental 
organisations. With the knowledge gained, resources 
committed to risk management can be better 
allocated, reducing associated costs and improving 
on business objectives. 
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